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The shock of the 11 September attacks prompted an immediate renewal of public interest in books on terrorism, a genre that attracted considerable attention
in the 1970s but had since maintained primarily an academic readership. Sales
of books on terrorist groups, Islamic fundamentalism, and American policies
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toward terrorism skyrocketed. Some are reissues, some are newly published
scholarly works, while others advocate specific policies to be followed. To understand the current wisdom on this topic requires an examination of all three
categories.
Christopher Harmon is currently on the faculty of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. His Terrorism Today was published two years prior to
“9/11,” yet it remains the best single volume on post–Cold War terrorism, because of its “straight ahead” style that leads the reader through the types, techniques, and objectives of various groups without an excess of academic jargon.
He approaches the subject with thoroughness and a distinct effort to reduce its
apparent complexity to simpler, actionable concepts. Harmon’s ultimate purpose is to inspire and assist counterterrorist planning by pointing out popular
misconceptions about terrorists’ motives rather than laying down a series of direct policy recommendations.
Particularly refreshing for an academic volume is Harmon’s underlying (but
not overwhelming) sense of moral indignation—a sense that strengthens the
book rather than makes it suspect. There is no “one man’s terrorist is another’s
freedom fighter” waffling for Harmon. He provides a simple, compelling definition: “Terrorism is the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends.” The key words are, of
course, deliberate and systematic physical harm to innocents (civilians) as a strategy for war. In Harmon’s construct, terrorism remains an offense against humanity, requiring a combination of vigorous national policies, international
law, and global cooperation that holds no sympathy for pseudo-heroic gestures
by supposed leaders of the oppressed.
Paul Pillar’s Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy was published in January 2001,
making it slightly more current than Harmon’s book. It is less a history and more
a balanced recommendation for policy, which, unfortunately, means that the
book’s “balanced approach” appears to lack the necessary intensity of a “post–9/11”
world. However, Pillar’s contribution is to place terrorism into the overall context of foreign policy—our and theirs. His focus is on the state sponsorship that
is inevitably required for successful international terrorism—a position that differs greatly from the current interpretation that global terrorists are independent
of state support, operating solely from areas of complete lawlessness.
While admitting that weak states such as Afghanistan or Somalia might be
convenient bases for terrorist training and planning, Pillar maintains that it is
the actions of governments through covert financing, moral support, or tacit
agreements to ignore terrorist infrastructures (as long as they are not the targets) that determine the success or failure of terrorism. From this perspective,
the tolerance of terrorist groups by Greece, a Nato ally, is as disturbing as that of
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hostile regimes, although it has been somewhat mitigated by the recent arrest of
those identified as members of the revolutionary organization 17 November.
Pillar argues that terrorism is “a problem managed, never solved.” He believes
that constant, unwavering diplomatic and economic pressure on those nations
that are tolerant of terrorists, along with rewards for cooperating with the
United States, are the most important tools to stop terrorism. Pillar was formerly the chief of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, a fact that in itself provides
insight into why the U.S. government views policies toward Iraq and other rogue
states as primary elements in the war against terrorism.
To Prevail won the race among think-tank efforts as the first to publish
counterterrorism policy recommendations after “9/11.” A product of a task
force consisting of more than twenty-four scholars and analysts from the Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the book figuratively, if not literally, was begun on 12 September 2001, reflecting the long-standing CSIS research program on emerging national security threats. Its speed of publication
and origin could be considered two strikes against the book were it not for the
editorial and organizational talent of its two principal authors, Kurt Campbell
and Michèle Flournoy, both former deputy assistant secretaries of defense. They
have crafted a balance between individual analyses of the varied tools of
counterterrorism, such as coalitions, military capabilities, intelligence, law enforcement, homeland security, public diplomacy, and foreign assistance, with
region-by-region assessments of current terrorist threats and foreign government responses.
To Prevail approaches post–Cold War terrorism as a “new form” of threat in
which psychological effects are subordinate to actual violence—in other words,
killing is now just as important as creating fear in the target audience—and
state-sponsorship plays a less important role (in contrast to Paul Piller’s view).
As examined in the chapter “Globalization Goes to War,” the tools that have
made for a more open world (cheap air travel, the Internet, cell phones, personal
freedom, and the ubiquitous media) have also magnified both the capabilities
and effects of global terrorism. Like other elements of globalization, restrictions
on these tools would come at considerable cost. An effective response requires
that the U.S. government protect the gains of globalization at the same time it attempts to defend against terrorism. To balance openness with protection obviously requires great care; hence, To Prevail is the most directly prescriptive of the
books under review, with eighteen detailed recommendations for the president
and Congress.
Some of these recommendations run counter to conventional wisdom. For example, the book recommended that Congress not create a Department of Homeland
Security, arguing that such a major institutional change diverts attention from
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actual counterterrorism activities. Current organizational structures are seen as
sufficient, if increased coordination and oversight is applied by the White
House. Also recommended is the firm establishment of homeland security as
the primary (if not sole) mission of the National Guard, whose duties are currently split between domestic response and overseas warfighting. An intriguing
recommendation is the creation of a nonmilitary homeland security service
corps, leading to congressional examination of “the merits of mandatory national service given the challenges of a new age.” The book’s own orientation is
split between recommending immediate, decisive action against terrorists and
concern for long-range efforts to ameliorate the so-called “root causes” of terrorism. The focus on potential causes for terrorism (poverty, perceived exploitation, unequal benefits of globalization, etc.) and de-emphasis on the importance
of state sponsorship creates the most significant intellectual contrasts between
the CSIS effort and Harmon and Pillar’s works.
Roland Jacquard’s knowledge of terrorist activities, gained through researching and writing a dozen books on terrorism, is only exceeded by his incredible
timing. In the Name of Osama Bin Laden was originally published (in French)
the same week as the September attacks. The core of the book is a brief biography of bin Laden, focusing on his role as recruiter and transporter of fundamentalist Muslim fighters as mujahedeen in Afghanistan’s war with the Soviet
Union, and later as terrorists. The key ingredient bin Laden provided to those
with an irrevocable hatred of the West was great amounts of money—enough to
make suicide into an effective weapon.
Jacquard is director of the Paris-based International Observatory on Terrorism and has been a consultant to the United Nations Security Council. In April
2001, Jacquard was able briefly to interview bin Laden himself by phone. As is
clear from responses to Jacquard’s questions, bin Laden sees no reason to hide
his hatred for Jews and Christians (no matter what their nationality or politics)
or his desire to obtain nuclear and biological weapons. In detailing the thoughts
and attitudes of bin Laden’s recruits (particularly those al-Qa‘ida members with
European citizenship) the book makes evident the underlying sense of anarchy
and war-lust that permeates the bin Laden “brotherhood.” A completely Muslim
(and thereby peaceful) world may be their eventual, theoretical objective, but
killing a few non-Muslims (while possibly achieving martyrdom) is a fine goal
for now.
Jacquard’s text provides few new revelations for the “post–9/11” reader, but
its fascinating details certainly make al-Qa‘ida seem, in retrospect, a most
obvious global threat long before September 2001. In preparing the Englishlanguage edition, Duke University Press doubled the number of pages by adding
interview transcripts, copies of translated al-Qa‘ida documents (some had been
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smuggled out of Afghanistan to sympathizers in Europe), and other reports collected by the author. However, like the text, none of them is a revelation, but all
fascinate nevertheless. Jacquard points out that bin Laden’s so-called “will,” a
document that circulated in London and Beirut in October 2001, portrays an
enduring linkage between himself and Hassan ibn al-Sabbah, founder of the
eleventh-century Assassins. Whether or not bin Laden is dead, his goal is for the
myth of unstoppable Muslim terrorists to survive. The document grandly
warns, “After me, the world of infidels will never again live in peace.”
Portraying terrorists with their own words and documents is a key feature of
another well-timed publication, Henderson’s Global Terrorism. In it you will
find the Website addresses for such Internet-minded terrorist groups as Hamas.
Like most Facts On File books, this one is authoritative but not dull and lives up
to its objective to provide a one-stop reference of “how to research terror.” In addition to technical, well-referenced discussions of how to define terrorism and a
survey of existent terror groups, the book strongly focuses on legal issues, with a
chronology of counterterrorist laws and court cases. Demonstrative of this focus
is an appendix containing the text of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, but the annotated bibliography would appeal to more than just
legal researchers. It is tough to find a more current initial starting point for any
research project on contemporary terrorism.
The Terrorism Threat and U.S. Government Response began as a conference
sponsored by the U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (or INSS,
located at the Air Force Academy) in July 1998. The book was published in 2001
and is a compilation of ongoing research by thirteen participants rather than a
conference report per se, which allows some of the individual chapters to retain
considerable “post–9/11” relevance. Even though many of the contributors are
the usual suspects in the scholarly study of terrorism and others are spokesmen
for federal agencies extolling their counterterrorism efforts, there are several
controversial and contending conclusions that require examination.
For example, Bruce Hoffman, the long-standing “dean” of counterterrorism
and counterproliferation at RAND, argues that the U.S. interpretation of how to
deter terrorism is flawed. Qaddafi, he argues, did not stop sponsoring terrorist
activities after the EL DORADO CANYON strike on Libya, he simply moved to less
spectacular, less attributable acts. Even if such “traditional” retaliatory
counterstrikes are presumed to have worked in the past, they no longer retain
much validity against today’s global terrorists. Hoffman agrees with To Prevail
that post–Cold War terrorists differ greatly from their predecessors; they are
subject to neither rational deterrence nor evidence of counterproductive effects
on their putative goals. In fact, the need for preemption, which was in 1998
conceptually integrated into the Clinton administration’s counterproliferation
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policy (to which Hoffman, among others, contributed), is an undercurrent
throughout the many chapters of the book. This might indeed be a revelation to
those who view the current administration’s emphasis on developing preemption strategy as something entirely new. In the chapter by James J. Wirtz of the
Naval Postgraduate School, the link is made between counterterror and
counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Terrorism, like weapons
of mass destruction, is viewed as an evolving asymmetric tool of forces too weak
to fight the U.S. military conventionally. Wirtz differs, however, from Hoffman
and others in his view that “traditional” military forces may indeed retain a considerable deterrent and responsive role.
The Terrorism Threat and U.S. Government Response makes it clear that well
before “9/11” all the experts viewed al-Qa‘ida as a severe threat. However, no one
expected an attack so severe. Reviewing the 1993 World Trade Center bombing,
Hoffman wondered whether it was even possible to “topple the North Tower.”
Thus the book underscores its predictions on the unpredictability but exponentially increasing danger of the “new” global terrorism.
Stylistically, Beyond Terror is in a category of its own; reading it is a plunge
into a pool of fine literary imagery. In a fairer world, Ralph Peters would be recognized as one of the premiere essay writers in America today. He is that good.
His subject matter, however (defense strategy, military ethics, and the clash of
tribal warriors versus modern soldiers), deters the editors of most highbrow literary journals from admitting him into their pantheon. Peters applies a novelist’s skill (he has published nine) to his exposition of future threats the United
States may face. Of course, it is doubtful that Peters, a retired Army officer, unabashed American patriot, and iconoclastic realist who has actually seen some
of the world’s meaner backstreets, would feel terribly comfortable in a modern
literary temple. His writing has more the intensity of an Old Testament prophet
pointing out the pretentions of worldly kings.
Beyond Terror is a collection of eighteen essays that fully display Peters’s talents, many of which were previously published in Parameters, the Washington
Post, and elsewhere, although not assembled until after “9/11.” Those familiar
with his work know that Peters does not view post–Cold War terrorism as something new. It is simply a feature of the return of the savage-warrior—men from
decaying societies, unable to compete in a globalized world, who hold the fantasy of a glorious, imperial past and whose self-esteem is built on the power of
violence. In Peters’s construct, such men have more in common with criminal
gangs than soldiers—which is undoubtedly why many terrorist groups have no
qualms about financing their activities through drug and prostitute smuggling,
bank robbery, kidnapping, etc. Neither diplomatic negotiations nor efforts to
ameliorate “root causes” have much effect on current terrorists—although they
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may help in stemming the tide of future recruits. To appeal to or appease the apparently intelligent and sophisticated leaders and sponsors of terrorism (or even
the less sophisticated foot soldiers) is a mistaken policy. Most of them have no
understanding or acceptance of the social norms of modern society. As Peters
puts it, “A cell phone held to the ear does not mean a modern mind is at work on
the other side of the eardrum.”
Peters advocates increased American knowledge of, involvement in, and
developmental assistance for the struggling nations of the world (with logical
priorities rather than open-ended assistance), along with unrelenting, remorseless destruction of the warrior-terrorists and their leaders. What is needed is neither policy nuances nor governmental reorganization but a willingness to fight
intelligently and over the long term in a brutal arena, with the difficult choices,
casualties, and inevitable collateral damage that it entails. This requires a sense
of humility and respect for non-Western cultures, along with steady pull on the
trigger when violence threatens. As Peters advises in his most suggestive essay,
“When Devils Walk the Earth,” we must be willing to “whenever legal conditions
permit, kill terrorists on the spot. . . . This is war, not law enforcement.”
How can one distill this current wisdom on terror? The most effective way is
to point out the differences. The volumes by Harmon, Pillar, Campbell and
Flournoy, and Smith and Thomas (USAF, INSS) all see a restructured post–Cold
War terrorist threat that, especially after “9/11,” requires new and dynamic policies by the U.S. government. All view homeland security as important, but Pillar
differs from Campbell and Flournoy and many of the contributors to the INSS
volume in his insistence that it is the domestic actions of foreign states that are
the keys to diminishing terrorism. Counterterrorism is therefore a critical element of our overall foreign policy, not a separate war.
Campbell and Flournoy advocate considerable homeland security efforts
(and a war against terrorist groups, rather than states) but see victory in ameliorating the “root causes” that induce sympathy for the putative goals of the terrorists. In contrast, Harmon and many of the INSS contributors see a more
direct course to victory through military and police action. Henderson’s reference guide seems to suggest that counterterrorism belongs almost exclusively
within the sphere of criminal justice. Jacquard and Peters, while potentially sympathetic to the need for a more just global environment, maintain that the “root
causes” of terrorism remain within the psyches of the terrorists themselves,
whose leaders are hardly poverty-stricken or oppressed. Fighting poverty may
be a just policy, but crushing the will of the terrorists by defeating, killing, or jailing them would prove even more effective.
Jacquard’s and Peters’s emphasis on the terrorist psyche has recently acquired its
own terminology. Writing in the August/September 2002 issue of Policy Review,

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003

7

Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 1, Art. 10
154

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Lee Harris proffers the term “fantasy ideology” to describe the motives of
al-Qa‘ida and similar groups. To these groups the United States is merely a stage
prop, and whether Americans are terrified or not, change policies or not, or even
solve the Palestinian issue is almost inconsequential. The point of their action is
how it makes them feel about themselves as glorious martyrs in a sort of Islamic
“dungeons and dragons” world where the will of God has no need for
cause-and-effect logic. Harris commends President George W. Bush for initially
using the term “evildoers” to describe the “9/11” hijackers, despite media howls
at the “lack of sophistication” that the reference to evil indicates. Jacquard and
Peters, like Harris, will admit that although al-Qa‘ida also sees their enemies as
“evil,” they are nevertheless themselves committed “doers” of things that are not
logical, effects-oriented, or even moral from their own religious standpoint. But
like the Columbine High School killers, their deeds transform them from outcasts into masters of their universes.
The use of “evildoers” can actually be a summary method to categorize the
books under review. Three texts logically support its use, three find it “less than
sophisticated” or “less than helpful,” and one is mixed on the subject. Such is, in
itself, an accurate breakdown of the differing strands of current American wisdom on terror.
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